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Comprehensive panel data on privatization transactions and labor productivity in 
Romanian industrial corporations are used to describe the post-privatization ownership structure, 
and to estimate the effect of Romania’s diverse privatization policies on firm performance.  The 
econometric results show consistently positive, highly significant effects of private ownership on 
labor productivity growth, the point estimates imply ing an increased 1.0 to 1.7 percentage 
growth for a 10 percent rise in private shareholding.  The strongest estimated impacts are 
associated with sales to outside blockholders; insider transfers and mass privatization are 





1.  INTRODUCTION 
The impact of privatization on enterprise performance has been a key analytic and policy 
issue in the transformation of formerly socialist economies, and a sizable body of empirical 
literature is accumulating on the topic.1  In this paper, we extend the privatization-performance 
research agenda to Romania, a large country in Eastern Europe that has been the subject of 
relatively little systematic analysis.  Previous studies of Romanian privatization have focused on 
describing the policies themselves, and they have not provided information concerning either the 
resulting ownership structure or the effects on firm performance. 2  Previous research on firm 
behavior in Romania has generally relied on small samples of firms and emphasized issues other 
than privatization. 3 
Our study is motivated not only by the usefulness of adding another country to the list of 
those for which an analysis of post-privatization ownership and enterprise performance has been 
conducted, but also by the broader lessons that Romania’s experience may offer on the effects of 
alternative privatization policies and ownership structures on firm behavior.  The privatization 
process in Romania has been quite heterogeneous, involving all the major methods employed in 
transition economies: employee buyouts, mass privatization, and sales to outside investors.  The  
                                                
1 Djankov and Murrell (2000) and Megginson and Netter (2001) provide surveys of research on enterprise 
restructuring in transition economies and on privatization and firm performance, respectively. 
2 Earle and Sapatoru (1993) describe the initial framework for Romanian privatization policies; Earle and Sapatoru 
(1994) analyze the role of the Private Ownership Funds; Munteanu (1997) discusses the legal framework for 
Management and Employee Buyouts; Earle and Telegdy (1998) study the Mass Privatization Program; Negrescu 
(2000) provides a policy overview and some case studies; and Telegdy et al. (forthcoming) provide information on 
privatization through the Bucharest Stock Exchange. 
3 The sole exception is a study of the impact of privatization on total factor productivity growth in seven countries, 
including Romania, by Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl (1997).  The usefulness of the Romanian results in this study is 
constrained by the data, however:  the time series ends in 1995, by which time very little privatization had taken 
place, and the only available ownership measure is a dummy variable for privatization, with no information on 
different methods of privatization or on types of private owners and their shareholdings.  Other firm-level studies of 
Romania include Konings (1997) on the impact of competition, Konings and Repkin (1998) on the relationship of 
technical efficiency and profitability, Carlin, Estrin, and Schaffer (2000) on European Union accession, and Djankov 
(1999a) on the isolation program for loss-making firms. 
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employee buyout and mass privatization methods resulted in dispersed inside and outside 
ownership, respectively, while sales nearly always involved large blocks of shares.  At the same 
time, the process has been incomplete, leaving many companies fully or partially in state hands 
despite repeated governmental proclamations of intentions to “accelerate” the process.  Thus, the 
post-privatization ownership structure contains significant components of insiders, outsiders, and 
the state, and examples of both concentrated and dispersed ownership among firms with private 
outside shareholders. 
Our database, which we have constructed from several sources, is unusual in enabling us 
to measure virtually all privatization transactions and different types of acquiring owners in the 
corporatized enterprises from 1992 to 1998 in Romania.  To estimate the impact of owner-types 
on firm performance, we have linked the ownership information with panel data containing basic 
information on industrial firms for each year from 1992 to 1999.  Unlike previous studies of the 
impact of privatization in most countries, we are thus able to provide estimates based on a large 
sample, including nearly the entire surviving population of industrial joint-stock companies 
eligible for privatization in Romania, which amounts to about 90 percent of such companies in 
1999, and containing longitudinal data spanning the pre- and post-privatization periods. 
Our empirical strategy follows the broader literature on firm performance in the choice of 
the dependent variable and controlling covariates, and we employ a variety of alternative 
econometric techniques to control for potential selection bias and measurement error.  Subject to 
the constraints of the data, which—despite their richness concerning the post-privatization 
ownership structure—are rather limited in financial and operating information, we investigate 
possible problems of endogeneity in the determination of the ownership variables.  We also 
consider alternative specifications of the functional form through which ownership affects firm 
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performance; in particular, we estimate both linear equations based on proportionate 
shareholdings and threshold models of majority privatization and of the largest owner type, a 
specification commonly adopted in the literature.  In the latter specification, we use time-
invariant group effects to control for pre-privatization differences in performance and to permit 
an assessment of the magnitude of such differences. 
Section 2 describes the construction of the data, the Romanian privatization process, and 
the post-privatization ownership structure.  Section 3 presents econometric specifications, 
Section 4 reports estimation results, and Section 5 concludes with a summary of our findings. 
 
2.  DATA, PRIVATIZATION POLICIES, AND OWNERSHIP OUTCOMES 
2.1  Database Construction 
Our analysis of the post-privatization ownership structure is based on unpublished data 
from multiple sources that we have linked together.4  The information on the ownership of the 
initially state-owned joint-stock companies is compiled from seven databases: the State 
Ownership Fund (SOF) Transactions Database, the SOF Portfolio Database, and one database for 
each of the five Private Ownership Funds (POFs).5  From these sources, we construct a nearly 
complete evolution of the post-privatization ownership structure through the end of 1998 for all 
initially state-owned enterprises in the SOF portfolio.  Thus, the sample includes all the surviving 
joint-stock (“commercial”) companies, but it excludes spin-offs of shops and other assets from 
the parent companies as well as the regii autonome, which are discussed later in this section.  We 
construct our final sample for the ownership structure by selecting all industrial firms, resulting 
                                                
4 The appendix of Earle and Telegdy (2002) contains a detailed description of the construction of the database. 
5 The establishment and functions of these organizations are discussed in detail in the second part of this section. 
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in 2,354 cases representing about 95 percent of the total number of surviving industrial firms 
from the SOF portfolio.6 
To study firm performance, we draw information on employment and sales for each year 
from 1992 to 1999 from the corresponding Romanian Enterprise Registries.7  The Registries 
have nearly complete information on all registered firms with at least five employees, but in each 
year from 1993 to 1999, between 8 and 11 percent of the firms have missing values; the 
percentage missing is 18 percent in 1992.  Table 1 presents the number of observations in the 
final sample, by year.  In summary, the data enable us to measure the post-privatization 
ownership structure of almost all industrial joint-stock companies from the surviving population 
of the SOF, and to estimate the relationship between privatization methods and performance for 
about 90 percent of these companies. 
2.2 Corporatization and Residual State Ownership 
 Similar to most other transition economies, the process of large and medium-sized 
enterprise reform in Romania began with corporatization of the SOEs, in order to make possible 
their transfer to multiple owners.  In Romania, the legal conversion took place relatively quickly 
and was completed by 1991, when the SOEs were divided into two groups: regii autonome 
(remaining SOES) and societati comerciale (commerical companies).  The so-called “strategic” 
companies were included in the former group, and although relatively small in number (about 
400 companies), they tended to be large in size, accounting for about 47 percent of total SOE 
                                                
6 Incomplete information in the files resulted in the loss of about five percent of all observations. 
7 Sales are deflated by producer price indices, usually at the 4-digit industry level.  See the appendix of Earle and 
Telegdy (2002) for more detail. 
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assets (Romanian Development Agency, 1997).8  The second group of firms, nearly all of which 
were reorganized as open joint-stock companies, is the focus of attention in this paper. 
The shares in these corporatized entities were placed in a newly established State 
Ownership Fund (SOF) and one of five Private Ownership Funds (POFs), in a ratio of 70:30 
percent.  The SOF’s organization and governance resembled those of Ministries of Privatization 
and State Property Funds in other transition economies.  The POFs, however, were more 
unusual.  Despite their name, they remained state-governed, their boards of directors appointed 
by the government and approved by the Parliament, and their nominal owners, who were the 
approximately 18 million Romanian citizens, without any effective means of control.  Thus, we 
treat the POFs as a separate category, neither private nor state, in the empirical analysis. 9 
As presented in Table 2, our database contains 2,354 industrial firms in SOF ownership in 
1992, when the privatization process began.  Most of these (1,822 firms or 77 percent of the 
total) still had some state ownership at the end of 1998.  Indeed, the SOF holding, conditional on 
being present in these firms, was 46.9 percent at the mean and 50.9 at the median.  The 
unconditional mean, the evolution of which we have calculated in Table 3, fell from 70 percent 
at the end of 1991 to 36.3 percent at the end of 1998.  As a percentage of firms by largest owner-
type, the SOF share fell from 100 to 47.6 percent, as reported in Table 4.  Concerning POF 
ownership, 941 firms were partially POF-owned at the end of 1998, with a conditional mean of 
20.1 percent.  The POF has almost always been a minority owner, and only 32 of these firms 
were majority POF-owned.  Starting from the 30 percent handed over to them in 1991, the POF 
                                                
8 The average number of employees in the 357 regii included in the Romania n Enterprise Registry was 2,988 in 
1992. 
9 Earle and Sapatoru (1993, 1994) describe the legal basis and incentives of the SOF and POFs during their first few 
years of operation.  From 1996 to 1997, the POFs were converted into investment funds, known in Ro manian as 
SIFs, but their governance remained nontransparent, each having several million small shareholders and explicit 
rules preventing ownership concentration.  We refer to them as POFs for simplicity.  See Negrescu (2000) for more 
discussion of the POF/SIFs. 
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share declined to 8.0 by the end of 1998 (Table 3); they were never the largest owner in any but a 
very small number of firms (able 4).10 
The Romanian Privatization Law of 1991 and associated regulations charged the SOF 
with the privatization of all the shares in its portfolio within seven years.  But the law provided 
little guidance on how this goal was to be accomplished, specifying only a very general list of 
possible methods.  In practice, three fairly specific techniques have dominated Romanian 
privatization: management-employee buyout (MEBO), the mass privatization program (MPP), 
and block sales of shares to outside investors.  Sales were intended to be the primary method of 
privatization from the beginning, although the MEBO method had already received some 
encouragement in the Privatization Law’s provision for preferential terms for managers and 
employees.  These included the right of first refusal and installment payments at very low 
interest rates, and these preferences were expanded and extended in later legislation. 11  The MPP 
was adopted later, in 1995, as an announced attempt to “accelerate” the rate of property transfer. 
2.3 The Management-Employee Buyout (MEBO) Method 
Transfer of shares to employees, through giveaways or sales at low prices, has been a 
common privatization method in transition economies due to the relative ease of administrative 
and political implementation.  The method is controversial, however, and frequently alleged to 
be ill-suited to the restructuring demands of the transition. 12  On the one hand, insider 
                                                
10 The tables also present the shares owned by a group labelled as “others,” which are not identifiable on the basis of 
the SOF sources.  Of the 18 firms in which others were the majority owners, we were able to obtain further 
ownership data on the 7 firms listed on the Stock Exchange or RASDAQ, the over-the-counter market.  In these 
firms, outside blockholders had majority stakes in 4 and the employees’ organizations had majority ownership in 3. 
11 MEBOs began in earnest in 1993, although a law formalizing the practices was adopted only in 1994; see 
Munteanu (1997) for a detailed discussion.  After 1996, sales to employees were no longer formally referred to as 
MEBOs, but the institutional arrangements remained the same. 
12 Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994), and Lipton and Sachs (1990) argue against privatization to employees, while 
Ellerman (1993), Stiglitz (1999) and Weitzman (1993) argue in favor of this policy.  Estrin, Jones, and Svejnar 
(1987) analyze the performance effects of producer cooperatives in Western economies, and Earle and Estrin (1996) 
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of worker and manager ownership in transition economies. 
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privatization may improve work incentives, company loyalty, and support for restructuring.  If 
ownership is widely dispersed among employees, it may also facilitate takeovers by outsiders.13  
On the other hand, employees may lack the necessary skills, capital, access to markets, and 
technologies necessary to turn their firms around.  Corporate governance by employees may 
function particularly poorly when the firm requires difficult restructuring choices that have 
disparate distributional impacts within the firm. 14 
While standard arguments such as these might have some relevance for every form of 
employee ownership in the transition economies, the Romanian MEBOs also have some 
significant institutional peculiarities.  These stem largely from the legal requirement that the 
employees establish an employees’ association to hold the shares and exercise most ownership 
rights during the repayment period of 3 to 5 years, in order to obtain the payment preferences.15  
During the repayment period, the unpaid shares may not be resold; this constraint limits the 
possibility for concentration or takeovers that might improve governance.  Moreover, the 
Romanian privatization contracts often included restrictions on changes in the firm’s 
employment level and main product that also applied during the repayment period.  The 
complicated governance and limitations on restructuring that resulted from these arrangements 
may have further attenuated any potentially positive effects of privatization on these firms’ 
performance. 
In addition to these institutional peculiarities, insider privatization in Romania is also 
somewhat unusual in the magnitude of the insider share in the affected firms.  Table 2 shows that 
                                                
13 For a review of evidence on the productivity effects of worker ownership in the West, see Bonin, Jones, and 
Putterman (1993). 
14 Hansmann (1990) contains a similar argument with respect to the patterns of worker ownership in Western 
economies. 
15 Anecdotal evidence suggests that voting within the employee association is sometimes according to one-member 
one-vote rather than by shareholding.  This suggests that MEBO firms are hybrid organizations, part public 
corporation and part producer cooperative. 
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a total of 858 industria l firms—over a third of all industrial firms in the SOF portfolio—had 
undergone MEBO transactions by the end of 1998, with the mean employee stake reaching 64.9 
percent and the median 70.6 percent.  Unlike most share transfers to employees in Hungary and 
Poland, and to an even greater degree than in Russia, the Romanian MEBOs tended to yield 
overwhelming employee ownership.  Usually the entire SOF stake of 70 percent was transferred 
to employees, although there were also some cases of minority participation, sometimes 
combined with other privatization methods.16 
Table 3 displays the evolution of ownership from 1992 to 1998.  MEBOs were most 
common in the years 1994 and 1995, although employees continued to buy out their companies 
through 1998 (the last year in our ownership data).  Second only to the SOF, MEBO participants 
were the largest owner-type in 24.5 percent of the firms at the end of 1998, as shown in Table 4.  
Measured either as the average percentage of shares privatized or the largest private owner-type, 
MEBO has been the single most important privatization method in Romania.  Therefore, 
Romanian MEBOs provide an interesting opportunity to test the effect of dominant employee 
ownership in a large number of privatized firms. 
2.4  The Mass Privatization Program (MPP) 
The second major method used in Romania was mass (or “voucher”) privatization.  As 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the rationale for this method was that the speed of privatization 
could be increased by overcoming the problems of insufficient demand due to low domestic 
savings and reluctance of foreign investors (Earle, Frydman, and Rapaczynski, 1993; Boycko, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994).  These programs were intended to jump-start domestic equity 
markets with a rapid release of shares, but they run the risk of highly dispersed ownership 
                                                
16 See Earle and Estrin (1996) for a comparative discussion.  The fraction obtained by insiders in Romanian MEBOs 
was frequently 100 percent, as the POFs often sold their shares simultaneously with the SOF. 
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structures.  This problem was normally addressed through the creation of intermediaries, either 
by the state as part of the program (e.g., in Poland) , or by private parties competing for 
individuals’ vouchers (e.g., in Czechoslovakia).  Although there has been little empirical 
evidence on the effects of these programs, a number of authors have been highly critical of them 
(Stiglitz, 1999; Black, Kraakman, and Tarrassova, 2000; Kornai, 2000; and Roland, 2001). 
The Romanian mass privatization program (MPP), carried out in 1995-96, provides an 
opportunity to analyze a rather extreme form of voucher privatization; one that ensured maximal 
dispersion of ownership by prohibiting the trading of vouchers and the formation of 
intermediaries.  The potential benefits of the program may also have been reduced by the large 
stake kept by the state: in most companies included in the program, only 60 percent of the shares 
were offered.   In those deemed strategic, which tended to be relatively large firms, the figure was 
only 49 percent.  Even these percentages were reached in very few companies, due to the 
peculiar asymmetry in the treatment of excess demand and excess supply in the allocation 
procedure.  Oversubscription resulted in pro rata allocation, while undersubscription resulted in 
untransferred shares.17  As Table 2 shows, a total of 1,727 industrial firms were included in the 
program, with a mean of 24.5 percent and a median of 18.4 percent privatized; only about one-
sixth of the firms in the program were majority privatized.  
The consequence of the MPP was inevitably an ownership structure heavily dominated 
by the state, which usually retained a majority stake, with a highly dispersed group of private 
owners.  The possibility for a positive impact of this program on firm performance would rest on 
some indirect mechanism: either through secondary sales leading to increased private ownership 
                                                
17  Earle and Telegdy (1998) analyze details of the MPP procedures.  The relevant law, No. 55/1995, refers to the 
acceleration of the privatization process in both its title and text.  The full law can be found in Romanian 
Development Agency (1996). 
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concentration, through share trading increasing information about firm performance and 
therefore improving managerial incentives,18 or through some complementarity with other 
owners, particularly blockholders that purchased shares through a direct sale.  In such cases, the 
MPP may still have had a positive effect, despite its design. 
Shares allocated in the MPP were taken from the portfolios of both the SOF and the five 
POFs, but the POFs could regain some shares if citizen-participants in the MPP exercised their 
option to place their vouchers with them.  On average, the POFs were net losers from this 
procedure by the program’s design.  As shown in Table 3, their mean share dropped from 23.8 
percent at the end of 1995 to 9.2 percent a year later.  Both before and after the MPP, the POFs 
also sold shares from their portfolios, resulting in a reduction of their stake to only 8.1 percent by 
the end of 1998.  Frequently, such sales were organized in conjunction with SOF privatization 
sales. 
2.5  Privatization through Sales to Outsiders 
The third major privatization method employed in Romania involved case-by-case sales 
of large blocks of shares to outside investors.  The most important method was closed-bid tender, 
in which not only the price offer but also the business plan, investment and employment 
promises, and other considerations were taken into account by the SOF in selecting the buyer.  
These considerations are frequently reflected in provisions of the privatization contract that 
restrict post-privatization behavior, as in the MEBO privatizations (Negrescu, 2000).  Although 
Romanian policymake rs may have considered themselves constrained politically to ensure 
continued employment and operation of the firms, such restrictions could have reduced 
                                                
18 After the MPP, most of the companies were listed on either the Bucharest Stock Exchange or RASDAQ, the over-
the-counter market in Romania. 
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restructuring in the companies privatized through block sales , and thus decreased the potential 
benefits of privatization.19 
 Moreover, the sales method has intrinsic problems that tend to make it slow and 
uncertain.  Multi-criteria tenders naturally involve a lack of transparency in the process, because 
there are no announced or pre-determined weights for the various aspects of the bid and potential 
participants are left guessing about the trade-offs among them.  The bids are not publicly 
revealed after the tender, making it difficult to monitor the SOF’s decisions.  Because of the lack 
of an objective criterion and the nontransparency of the process, the selection decision can be 
easily manipulated, creating the appearance—if not always the reality—of corruption.  Indeed, 
even a perfectly clean process organized by honest, well-intentioned bureaucrats is subject to 
corruption charges, because there is little defense against allegations of favoritism.  Opposition 
parties are quick to exploit the possibility, and government bureaucrats, fearing charges of 
corruption and with few incentives to privatize aggress ively, tend to act very cautiously.  Of 
course, the problems are magnified to the extent that some of the bureaucrats are less than honest 
and act as rent-seekers  both by taking bribes in the privatization process and by colluding with 
the enterprise managers to strip assets before privatization.  Political battles may also erupt over 
the fulfillment of the contractual restrictions, resulting in cancellation of privatization contracts 
and renationalization of firms.20  The cumulative effect is to further reduce demand and make 
sales more difficult as potential investors become more reluctant to participate in an uncertain 
environment.  
                                                
19 Unfortunately, our database does not permit us to measure these restrictions for each company separately. 
20 Our database shows that annulments of transactions are much more common for sales than for MEBOs, and that 
they are non-existent for MPP transfers. 
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These difficulties are reflected in the slow pace of privatization through sales in Romania, 
which has been similar to the experience of most other transition economies. 21  Nonetheless, the 
data contain a sufficient number of observations on sales to permit an evaluation of their impact 
on firm performance.  As shown in Table 2, 473 firms underwent large-block sales by the end of  
1998.  Most of these blocks were quite large, with an average of 53.8 percent and a median of 
50.9.  Out of these firms, 246 had majority outside ownership.  In 12.6 percent of the firms, 
blockholders were the largest—although not necessarily majority—type of owner (Table 4).22 
2.6 Summary of Post-Privatization Ownership and Corporate Governance 
This analysis of ownership results shows that the state’s share in the corporatized 
industrial companies had fallen to 36.3 percent on average by the end of 1998.  Most of the 
companies with private ownership became majority private.  The most prevalent types of owners 
were employees, with 23.6 percent on average, and participants of the Mass Privatization 
Program, with 18.2 percent on average.  Concentrated outsiders were present in 473 companies, 
or 20 percent of the sample, and the average stake in this group of firms was a majority.  In more 
than three-quarters of all firms, the SOF retained some ownership stake; within this group, the 
average state share was quite high, at 46.9 percent.  The heterogeneity of the Romanian 
privatization methods thus produced an interesting testing ground for examining the impact of 
alternative ownership structures on firm performance. 
Our discussion has also presented reasons why privat ization in Romania may have had 
little or no effect, or at least fewer benefits than if it had been optimally designed.  Each of the 
                                                
21 Eastern Germany, Hungary, and Estonia, each of which had clear advantages in selling to outsiders, are partial 
exceptions to the generally slow rate of privatization through sales in transition economies.  The pace was  criticized 
even in these three countries, however.  
22 The buyers were both domestic and foreign.  Domestic investors bought shares in 378 companies and foreigners 
in 98, with an average holding of 52.7 and 56.6 percent, respectively.  Earle and Telegdy (2001) contains more 
discussion of domestic and foreign ownership. 
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privatization methods created possible corporate governance problems (e.g., insider control, 
dispersion of shareholdings, and contractual restrictions) that might have blocked or reduced the 
new owners’ incentives to restructure and raise productivity.  An additional factor that could 
have weakened the impact of any form of privatization is the general business environment.  If 
property rights are not respected and enforcement of contracts and corporate governance rules is 
poor, the new owners may expect little return from their investments and restructuring efforts.23  
The business environment in Romania has been frequently criticized; for instance, in its regular 
grading of “institutional performance” in the transition economies, the EBRD (2000, p. 21) 
awarded Romania a score only slightly ahead of Russia and well behind Hungary, Poland, and 
the Czech Republic.  None of these economies were considered to have reached “a standard that 
would not look out of place in an industrialized market economy” (p. 16).  Privatization under 
such conditions, even sales of large blocks to outsiders, may not yield substantial benefits.  The 
question can only be decided through empirical analysis. 
 
3.  ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK  
Our empirical strategy follows the broader literature in estimating reduced form equations 
for firm performance as a function of ownership, while taking into account potential problems of 
heterogeneity, both observed and unobserved, and simultaneity bias.  Using a model for panel 
data in which i indexes firms  and t indexes years, we estimate equations of the following form: 
  Pit = β0 + β1OWNit + β2Xit + uit, (1) 
                                                
23 See Anderson, Lee, and Murrell (1999) for this argument with respect to Mongolia.  Black, Kraakman, and 
Tarrassova (2000) claim that privatization in a poor institutional environment actually increased asset-stripping and 
worsened firm performance in Ru ssia. 
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where Pit is a measure of firm performance, OWNit captures the ownership structure, sometimes 
as a vector of variables, Xit is a vector of covariates, and uit is a residual. 
Our measure of firm performance in this paper is the annual growth of labor productivity; 
the ratio of real sales to average employment.24  While it might seem desirable to use other 
performance indicators, such as profitability, Tobin’s Q, or total factor productivity, the available 
data do not permit us to measure these variables.  Without a measure of the capital stock or other 
inputs, we cannot estimate total factor productivity, nor do we have profits, return to assets, or 
stock market value.  These indicators suffer from severe measurement problems in the transition 
context , however due to the arbitrary valuation of the capital stock acquired during the socialist 
period, the ubiquitous hiding of profits, and underdevelopment of stock markets.  Moreover, 
labor productivity growth has the advantage of reflecting changes in the capital stock due to 
investment, which may itself demonstrate superior performance in the poorly functioning capital 
market environment of Eastern Europe.  Specifying the dependent variable as a growth rate 
serves to difference away any fixed firm-specific characteristics, such as superior technology or 
larger initial capital stock, that affect the level of labor productivity.  We also control for 
industry, size, and the lagged level of labor productivity to account for other differences across 
firms, such as in capital-labor ratios.  In some specifications we also include firm fixed-effects or 
group-effects for ownership types. 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the levels of average employment, real value of 
sales in thousands of 1992 lei, and labor productivity.  According to these data, average 
                                                
24 The level or growth of labor productivity is commonly used in studies of firm performance; see, e.g., Anderson, 
Lee, and Murrell  (2000), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), Carlin et al. (2001), Claessens and Djankov (1999a,b), 
Djankov (1999b,c), D’Souza and Megginson (1999), Earle (1998), Earle and Estrin (1997), Frydman et al. (1999),  
Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994), Pohl et al. (1997), and Weiss and Nikitin (1998).  Total factor 
productivity equations that include book values of the capital stock are estimated by Anderson, Lee, and Murrell 
(2000), Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl (1997), Piesse and Thirtle (2000), and Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997). 
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employment in industrial enterprises dropped every year by 8 to 17 percent, except for 1996, 
when the fall was around 4 percent.  Over the whole period, the cumulative drop was 55.7 
percent on average.  The real value of sales and labor productivity displayed much more volatile 
patterns, rising in some years and falling in others.  
Next we turn to the specification of the ownership structure, OWNit.  Our analysis of the 
Romanian privatization programs in the previous section suggests several alternative ways of 
specifying the ownership variables.  A first approach is based on the proportion of shares in 
private ownership.25  In this linear specification, an estimate of β1 refers to the average impact of 
an increase in private shareholding on firm performance.  An alternative specification involves a 
threshold or critical level of private ownership, below and above which an increase in private 
shareholding has zero marginal impact.  A natural candidate for the threshold is majority private 
ownership.  In these definitions, we do not treat the shareholdings of the POFs as private , but 
rather combine them with SOF ownership, for the reasons discussed in the previous section.26 
In other specifications of the ownership structure, we distinguish different types of new 
private owners: employees, mass privatization participants, and investors who purchase blocks of 
shares.  We treat POF ownership as a separate group, while another category represents 
unidentifiable owners in the database who have very small shareholdings on average.  We 
specify these ownership types by their percentage shareholdings in some specifications, and with 
respect to a shareholding threshold, here defined as the largest type of owner, in others. 27 
                                                
25 All the firms in the SOF portfolio, and therefore in our database, are share companies. 
26 The ownership variables take into account any privatization transactions that occurred during the preceding year; 
thus, OWN it refers to the ownership structure on January 1 of year t.  This date falls at the exact midpoint of the 
period of growth measured by th e dependent variable, labor productivity growth, since the latter is calculated using 
total sales and average employment for year t relative to year t-1. 
27 This specification is similar to that estimated by Frydman et al. (1999), and it differs from the dominant 
ownership approach of Earle and Estrin (1997) and others, which requires that the dominant shareholding exceed 
some minimum stake, e.g., 40 percent. 
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Turning to the control variables, Xit, we are interested in accounting for heterogeneity in 
performance, Pit, that may also be correlated with our variables of interest, OWNit.  The first 
problem involves mismeasurement in labor productivity due to firms differing systematically 
with respect to their production functions, levels of investment, and capital-labor ratios.  This 
suggests that industry effects and firm size should be included, and we specify 14 industrial 
categories and measure size by employment, lagged to avoid endogeneity problems.  Firms may 
also differ in their set-up costs, quality of equipment, and technology.  These characteristics are 
likely to be correlated with industry and size, and we also include the lagged level of labor 
productivity in Xit and, in some specifications, firm-specific fixed effects.28 
A second problem involves initial conditions and the magnitude of the demand shock 
faced by the firm, as the state cut its orders drastically and customer and supply chains broke 
down (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997).  Firms with better initial conditions may have been 
cushioned from the impact of competition, while those facing greater shocks may have had 
proportionately greater difficulty adjusting and maintaining productivity due to the costs of 
laying off workers and unbundling equipment.  These shocks may be correlated with industry 
and region, and they are likely to vary across years.  We include year, industry, and region 
effects, under the assumption that these may be correlated with unobserved shocks to a firm’s 
productivity.  It is frequently argued that larger firms face more difficult adjustments, thus lagged 
employment is useful here as well.  The region effects may also reflect market conditions in the 
firm’s environment.  For declining firms, particularly, maintaining productivity may be easier  
                                                
28 The lagged level of productivity is frequently included in productivity and productivity growth equations, e.g., 
Anderson, Lee, and Murrell (2000);  Earle (1998); Frydman et al. (1999).  Another argument for including it is the 
possibility that it is more difficult, other things being equal, to increase productivity if it is already high. 
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when the industry and region is growing because this facilitates the release of workers and 
capital to other firms.  Finally, the region effects may account for differences in relative input 
prices that could lead to different allocation of factors of production within firms.29 
With these specifications of the dependent variable, of the post -privatization ownership 
structure, and of the set of controls, the basic estimating equation focusing on private 
shareholdings is the following: 
Log(Sit/Eit)–Log(Sit-1/Eit-1)  =  β0 + β1PrivateShareit + β2Log(Sit-1/Eit-1) + β3LogEit-1  
  + ΣtβtYEARt + ΣjβjINDij + ΣkβkREGik + uit, (2) 
where Sit is sales of firm i in year t, Eit is the corresponding employment, YEARt represent year 
effects (t = 1993,...,1999), INDij are industry effects (j = 1,..,14), REGik are region effects (k = 
1,...6), β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and uit reflects unmeasured factors. 
When ownership shares are disaggregated by type, the estimating equation becomes:  
Log (Sit/Eit)–Log (Sit-1/Eit-1)  =  β0  
+ β11OutsideShareit + β12InsideShareit + β13MassShareit + β14OtherShareit + β15POFShareit 
  + β2Log(Sit-1/Eit-1) + β3LogEit-1 + ΣtβtYEARt + ΣjβjINDij + ΣkβkREGik + uit, (3) 
where the sum of the share variables plus the omitted state shareholding equals one. 
Even with such controls, it is possible that there is still some unmeasured heterogeneity 
correlated both with ownership and performance.  To take this into account, we also estimate 
equations 2 and 3 including firm fixed-effects.  In these models, the estimates of β1 and β11 to β15 
reflect the effects of the within-firm variation of ownership by permitting each firm to have a 
                                                
29 To assess the necessity of including these firm characteristics in the performance equation, we regress the share 
ownership variables on groups of industry, region, size-category, and year dummies.  Each group of dummies was 
jointly significant in every equation, nearly always at the 1 percent significance level, suggesting the importance of 
including them as controls.  Concerning industrial affiliation, the data show higher rates of privatization in the food, 
printing and publishing, furniture, footwear, textile, and other sectors of light industry.  Lower rates of privatization 
are found in heavy industrial sectors such as mining, wood, chemicals, metallurgy, and machine building. 
 18 
separate intercept.  Thus, any systematic variation across firms in the rate of its labor 
productivity growth will not contaminate the parameter estimates.  The firm fixed-effects also 
help to control for possible endogeneity of ownership, which may be due to a tendency for firms 
with higher productivity growth to be privatized.  As long as the unobserved component of 
productivity growth associated with the privatization propensity is fixed over time, the inclusion 
of firm effects controls for selection bias. 
We also estimate analogous equations with dummies representing majority privatized 
(PrivateDummy, defined as = 1 if PrivateShare > .5) or largest non-state owner (OutsideDummy, 
InsideDummy , MassDummy , OtherDummy , and POFDummy ).  In these models, we include 
group effects in the equations.  For example, the variable PrivateEver indicates whether the firm 
ever became majority private during the entire sample period.  Thus, the estimating equation is:  
Log (Sit/Eit)–Log (Sit-1/Eit-1)  =  γ0 + γ00PrivateEveri + γ10PrivateDummy it  
  + γ2Log(Sit-1/Eit-1) + γ3LogEit-1 + ΣtγtYEARt + ΣjγjINDij + ΣkγkREGik +vit, (4) 
where γ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and vit represent the residuals associated with 
this specification of ownership.  Note that PrivateDummyit is nested in PrivateEveri, so that the 
estimated coefficient on PrivateDummyit reflects the impact of becoming majority privately 
owned relative to pre-privatization performance. 
The analogous equation for the disaggregated case with largest owner dummies is: 
Log (Sit/Eit)–Log (Sit-1/Eit-1)  =  γ0  + γ01OusideEveri + γ02InsideEveri  
+ γ03MassEveri + γ04OtherEveri + γ05POFEveri+ γ11OusideDummyit  + γ12InsideDummyit  
+ γ13MassDummyit + γ14OtherDummyit + γ15POFDummyit 
  + γ2Log(Sit-1/Eit-1) + γ3LogEit-1 + ΣtγtYEARt + ΣjγjINDij + ΣkγkREGik + vit, (5) 
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where the group effects (OusideEveri, etc.) are constant over time, analogously to PrivateEveri.  
This method imposes a stronger restriction than the firm fixed-effects specification, but it also 
has the advantage of permitting some inferences to be drawn concerning the pre-privatization 
performance of firms that are privatized subsequently.  For example, in equation (4), γ00 
represents the difference between the productivity growth of firms that have not yet been 
privatized but will be in the future, and the productivity growth of firms that are never privatized 
within our sample period.  If better performing firms tend to be privatized, γ00 should be positive.  
On the other hand, γ10 represents the post-privatization change in labor productivity growth 
relative to the pre-privatization growth rate of firms that are eventually observed to be privatized.  
If privatization is pure selection, γ10 should be zero.  In equation (5), the parameters (γ01,...,γ05) 
represent the labor productivity performance of the firm prior to its acquisition by the given 
owner-type, relative to firms remaining in state ownership.  The group effects may be interpreted 
as estimates of the selection bias into each ownership category, while the coefficients on the 
largest owner dummies (γ11,...,γ15) reflect the change in performance associated with ownership 
change. 
Our efforts to control for selection bias notwithstanding, the possibility remains that some 
dynamic selection mechanism exists, whereby firms with greater possibilities for raising 
productivity growth have greater or smaller probabilities of being privatized and of being 
acquired by different types of private owners.  Such a selection mechanism could result in biased 
estimates if there is some characteristic of firms, for example their quality, that is observable to 
buyers or to the SOF but not to the researcher.  This characteristic cannot relate to either the level 
or growth of labor productivity, because such an effect would be eliminated by the firm fixed-
effects in a growth equation.  Rather, the characteristic must accelerate productivity, and it must 
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be independent of all of our control variables, if it is to create selection bias.  Such a selection 
mechanism may seem implausible, but it would be desirable to check for it if data were available 
to instrument changes in the ownership structure.  Instruments would need to be correlated with 
ownership change but not with labor productivity growth, which is difficult to satisfy.  
Unfortunately, our analysis uses all the variables in our database and we have no appropriate 
instruments for such an investigation.  All studies of privatization and firm performance, 
including studies that treat selection bias through fixed effects, face this problem.  The possibility 
of such a dynamic selection mechanism should be considered in interpreting results.30 
A final issue concerns measurement error.  Although we have carefully constructed and 
cleaned our data, some significant outliers remain.  We cannot be sure whether these represent 
true differences across firms or simply noise associated with most large firm-level databases.  
Moreover, the fixed-effects procedure that we employ in some specifications is especially 
sensitive to measurement error, because within-firm estimates may exacerbate the noise-to- 
signal ratio.  For these reasons and to establish the robustness of our results, we estimate all 
equations using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and least absolute deviations (LAD) or 
median regressions.  This latter procedure puts equal weight on all observations regardless of 
how far they lie from the regression line; hence, large outliers do not influence the estimates as 
much as in OLS. 
 
 
                                                
30 Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997) use contemporaneous financial indicators, namely exports, sales, profits, wage 
bonus, and debts, to instrument employee and foreign ownership in total factor productivity regressions.  Anderson, 
Lee, and Murrell (2000) exploit details of the privatization process to instrument ownership in Mongolia, and Earle 
(1998) instruments ownership with privatization method and other variables in Russia.  None of these studies use 
group- or fixed-effects. 
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4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
We first examine the association between ownership and productivity growth, starting 
with simple descriptive statistics and tests of differences of means across ownership categories.  
Table 6 pools the data across years, treating each firm-year as an independent observation, and 
reports the mean productivity growth by dominant owner.  State and Private refer to majority 
ownership, while the disaggregated private groups (i.e., Outside, Inside, and Mass) are classified 
according to their largest private owner type.  Firm-year observations in which the state was 
majority owner tend to have a productivity decline of –0.024 at the mean.  Privatized firms tend 
to have a productivity increase of 0.012 on average.  This difference is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level.  Concerning disaggregated private categories, both inside - and mass-owned 
firms experience average productivity declines of –0.007 and –0.014, respectively, but the 
differences from state-owned firms are not statistically significant.  Firm-year observations in 
which the dominant owner was an outside blockholder, however exhibit increased labor 
productivity by an annual average of about 13 percent, and the difference with state ownership is 
highly significant. 
These descriptive statistics take no account of possible omitted variables and selection 
biases in estimating the performance-ownership relationship.  Before turning to the regression 
estimates in which other factors are included as controls, we look for evidence of selection bias.  
For example, this may arise if more efficient firms are privatized more easily and have a higher 
probability of obtaining active owners (e.g., concentrated external investors).  A first test of 
possible selection bias is reported in Table 7, where we report the pre-privatization productivity 
growth rates for firms that are subsequently privatized and compare these with the growth rate 
for firms never privatized within our observation period.  The first column of the table contains 
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the average annual productivity growth for firms that never became majority private, while the 
other columns refer to firm-year observations previous to becoming majority private, or previous 
to becoming dominated by a particular type of owner, using the same categories and definitions 
as in Table 6.  The mean growth rates lie in a narrow range, from –0.032 to 0.008, and the t-test 
of the difference in the means relative to the category of “never majority private” is never 
significant.  The small differences in the means for firms that subsequently became outside 
investor-owned are particularly striking compared with the differences in their post-privatization 
performance reported in Table 6.  This basic test reveals no evidence of selection bias in the 
privatization process. 
In the regression results, we control for third factors that may influence both firm 
performance and ownership.  Table 8 examines the effect of the private share on productivity 
growth, based on equation (2) estimated using OLS, LAD, and fixed-effects.  Private 
shareholding is estimated to have a positive and statistically significant effect on productivity 
growth in every equation.  The point estimate varies between 0.102 and 0.167, depending on the 
estimation method employed. 31 
These results refer to the average effect of privatizing an additional one percent of the 
firm’s shares, without distinguishing the type of new private owner.  Table 9 contains estimates 
of equation (3), which disaggregates private ownership shareholdings into several subcategories.  
Each type of private shareholding is estimated to have positive effects that are statistically 
signif icant at the 1 percent level.  The inside and mass privatization coefficients range from 
                                                
31 We focus on results concerning our variables of interest, because the others are only control variables and not the 
focus of this paper.  However, we should emphasize that the results are robust to changes in the specification.  To 
check whether the results are sensitive to measurement error that creates spurious correlation between the dependent 
variable and either lagged productivity or lagged employment, we experimented with including two-period rather 
than one-period lags and dropping one or both variables from the regression.  None of these alternative 
specifications produced qualitatively different results for the ownership effects from those reported. 
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0.108 to 0.190 across specifications, but the difference between the estimated effects of these 
two types is not large or statistically significant.  Moreover, their relative ranking varies across 
specifications: in the OLS and fixed-effects models the coefficient of MassShare is larger, while 
in the LAD regression InsideShare has a larger coefficient.  However, outside blockholder shares 
have by far the largest coeffic ients in every equation, ranging from 0.274 to 0.392.  The 
differences between the estimated effects of OutsideShare and the other types of private 
ownership are large in every equation, and they are always statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. 
Tables 10 and 11 report the results of the models in which ownership is specified as a 
categorical variable and in which we also include group effects.  The estimates of equation (4) in 
Table 10, which contain a dummy variable for majority private ownership (PrivateDummy) and 
the group effect (PrivateEver), demonstrate a positive, statistically significant effect of majority 
privatization.  The point estimates imply 8.4 percent higher productivity growth for the OLS and 
6.6 percent higher in the LAD regression for majority privatized firms relative to their pre-
privatization performance.  The estimated coefficient of PrivateEver is also positive and 
significant in both specifications, indicating a higher pre-privatization growth rate of firms 
subsequently majority privatized relative to those never majority privatized.  The estimated 
coefficients are only one-third to one -half the size of those on PrivateDummy, however 
suggesting that selection effects have a much smaller impact than privatization. 32 
Estimates of equation (5), including dummies and group effects for disaggregated largest 
owner-types, are reported in Table 11.  In both the OLS and LAD models, the group effects for 
insider privatization suggest that firms with higher pre-privatization productivity growth rates are 
                                                
32 We also estimated equation (6) replacing the group effect with firm fixed-effects, resulting in an estimate 
coefficient (standard error) of 0.121 (0.012) on PrivateDummy. 
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more likely to be privatized by the MEBO method: InsideEver  has positive, significant estimated 
coefficients in both regression models.  Only the OLS model provides evidence of higher pre-
privatization productivity growth in OutsideEver, however.  Notwithstanding the presence of 
these group effects, the results are fully consistent with those for share ownership.  Outside 
blockholders are estimated to have the largest impact on productivity growth relative to their pre-
privatization performance, while the effects of insider and mass participants are smaller but still 
positive.33  Among the identified owner-types, OutsideDummy has the largest coefficients, and 
InsideDummy and MassDummy coefficients are smaller, while all are highly statistically 
significant.34  All forms of privatization appear to dominate continued state ownership.  As we 
have indicated, these results are highly robust to changes in the model specification. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION  
The debates over the effects of privatization on firm performance, which privatization 
method works best, and which type of owner is most likely to carry out restructuring have been 
lengthy and impassioned.  Yet there are remarkably few studies analyzing the privatization-
performance relationship using panel data from a large sample of firms containing information 
for periods both before and after privatization.  Given that privatization policies are typically so 
prominent and controversial, we know remarkably little about their outcomes in the transition 
economies.  Among these economies, Romania offers an interesting testing ground for two 
reasons.  First, we have been able to construct a data set containing high quality and nearly 
                                                
33 We also re-estimated equations (4) and (5) with a sample excluding firms privatized in 1998, so that only firms 
with at least two years of post-privatization observations were included.  This exercise produced very similar results 
to those reported in Tables 10 and 11. 
34 Estimating equation (5) with firm fixed-effects resulted in a somewhat higher outside and inside dummy 
coefficient, 0.191 and 0.101 respectively, and only trivial differences for the mass and POF dummy coefficients 
relative to Table 11.  OtherDummy  has the largest estimated impact in the OLS estimates, although not in LAD 
estimates, possibly because of the outside investor ownership discussed in Section 2. 
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complete information on the privatization process for corporatized industrial enterprises.  
Second, variants of all of the major types of privatization policies are represented, resulting in an 
ownership structure with significant stakes held by employees, dispersed and concentrated 
outsiders, and the state. 
Our analysis of the effects of Romania’s privatization policies on industrial enterprises 
had three elements: the ownership structure resulting from privatization, the corporate 
governance characteristics of privatized firms, and the association of ownership structure with 
enterprise productivity performance.  The description of the ownership structure represents the 
first comprehensive picture of the impact of privatization in the Romanian industrial sector.  We 
find that the state retained a dominant role in many Romanian firms through the end of 1998; in 
more than three-quarters, the SOF kept a positive ownership stake, and the average stake was 
46.9 percent within this group.  Only a slight majority (53.8 percent ) of the firms originally 
slated for privatization in 1992 had become majority private by 1998.  The most prevalent types 
of new private owners were insiders/employees, holding 23.6 percent on average, and 
participants of the Mass Privatization Program, with 18.2 percent on average.  Concentrated 
outsiders were present in only 473—or 20 percent—of the companies, but the average ownership 
stake in this group of firms was a majority.  
The discussion of the privatization methods and their ownership outcomes indicated 
possible corporate governance problems that might have reduced the potential benefits of 
privatization in Romania.  The analysis led us to hypothesize that sales to outside blockholders 
were most likely to have raised firm efficiency, but even these investors may be handicapped in 
restructuring efforts by contractual restrictions and other impediments posed by Romanian 
policies and business environment.  We also hypothesized that firms bought by their employees 
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may exhibit lower productivity performance due to the pursuit of non-value-maximizing 
objectives, difficulties in raising capital, and the continued role of the state through the 
institutional design of the MEBO privatization process.  Finally, the highly dispersed ownership 
structure resulting from the mass privatization suggests that MPP participants may be unlikely to 
contribute much to corporate governance, although secondary transactions might have created 
some concentration.  The weakness of these latter two programs raises the question of whether or 
not they led to any improvements in firm performance, relative to continued ownership by the 
state.  Given that most Romanian privatization was either MEBO or MPP, a corollary question is 
whether privatization in Romania has made any difference on average. 
Our empirical findings provide strong evidence that, despite the corporate governance 
problems resulting from peculiarities in its design, privatization has had a positive and 
substantial effect on the growth of labor productivity in Romania.  The statistical significance of 
these effects remains highly robust across alternative equation specifications and estimation 
methods.  Our work strongly supports the proposition that outside blockholders are the most 
effective owners of privatized companies.  More surprisingly, the estimated regression 
coefficients on disaggregated outsider owners (MPP participants) and on insiders (MEBO 
participants) are also positive and statistically significant.  Thus, the data provide evidence that 
even insiders and dispersed outside owners have a positive impact relative to continued state 
ownership, although these point estimates are distinctly and statistically significantly smaller 
than those of the outside blockholders.35 
                                                
35 Our ownership measures pertain only to the results from privatization transactions, and we do not observe 
subsequent secondary sales of shares.  Perhaps the employees and other individuals acquiring small quantities of 
shares through these programs sold them quickly so that some concentrated owners emerged subsequently. 
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This evidence implies that privatization has been surprisingly successful in Romania—for 
the firms that have been privatized.  For the others, the results suggest that waiting has been 
deleterious.  Given the large remaining state shareholdings, our analysis would recommend a 
further stage of what the Romanian government has been wont to call “acceleration.” 
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Table 1: Number of Firms with Complete Ownership, Employment and Sales Data 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of firms  1,931 2,074 2,115 2,134 2,179 2,183 2,202 2,168 
Percent of firms  82.0 88.1 89.8 90.7 92.6 92.7 93.5 92.1 
 




Table 2: Post-Privatization Ownership Structure, End–1998  
(percentage ownership conditional on a non-zero share in the firm) 
 











Number of firms with 
majority ownership-
type 
Sales (outside) 53.8 50.9 473 246 
MEBO (inside) 64.9 70.6 858 519 
Mass  24.5 18.4 1,747 296 
Other  10.4 1.2 693 18 
POF  20.1 18.6 941 32 
State  46.9 50.9 1,822 935 
 
Total number of firms: 2,354. 
 
Notes: “Sales (outside)” refers to outside investors who obtained their holdings through block 
sales, “MEBO (inside)” refers to employees who obtained shares through management -employee 
buyouts, “Mass” refers to individuals who obtained shares within the Mass Privatization Program, 
“Other” refers to owners not classifiable with available information, “POF” refers to Private 




Table 3: Evolution of the Ownership Structure  
(average percentage at year-end) 
 
Privatization Method / Owner-
Type 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sales (outside) 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.9 2.6 4.9 10.8 
MEBO (inside) 0.2 3.0 9.6 17.5 21.3 22.1 23.6 
Mass  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 18.2 18.2 
Other  0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.3 2.1 3.1 
Total private  0.4 3.6 11.0 19.6 43.4 47.3 55.7 
POF  29.8 28.7 26.4 23.9 9.1 8.7 8.0 
State  69.7 67.7 62.6 56.5 47.5 44.0 36.3 
N.B. Percentage of firms 
majority privatea 
0.4 3.3 10.3 18.4 38.7 43.8 53.8 
 
Number of firms: 2,354. 
 
Notes: “Sales (outside)” refers to outside investors who obtained their holdings through block sales, “MEBO 
(inside)” refers to employees who obtained shares through management-employee buyouts, “Mass” refers to 
individuals who obtained shares within the Mass Privatization Program, “Other” refers to owners not 
classifiable with available information, “POF” refers to Private Ownership Funds, and “State” refers to State 
Ownership Fund (SOF).  The calculation of total private excludes POF as well as state.  
 
a Percentage of firms with more than 50 percent of shares privately owned. 
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Table 4: Distribution of Firms by Largest Owner-Type 
(percent of firms at year-end) 
 
Privatization Method 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sales (outside) 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.1 2.4 5.0 12.6 
MEBO (inside) 0.2 3.0 9.7 17.4 21.5 22.3 24.5 
Mass  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.5 14.0 14.2 
Other  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 
POF  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 
State  99.6 96.7 89.7 81.6 62.3 58.0 47.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Number of firms: 2,354. 
 
Notes: “Sales (outside)” refers to outside investors who obtained their holdings through block sales, “MEBO (inside)” 
refers to employees who obtained shares through management-employee buyouts, “Mass” refers to individuals who 
obtained shares within the Mass Privatization Program, “Other” refers to owners not classifiable with available 







Table 5: Summary Statistics for Employment, Real Sales and Labor Productivity 
 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
          
Mean 1,154.3 1,045.5 898.9 836.1 788.9 733.8 622.2 514.4 Employment 
Std. Dev. 1,778.0 1,707.1 1,587.2 1,558.8 1,908.7 1,451.6 1,266.8 1,083.8 
          
          
Mean 2,072.1 2,328.0 1,864.1 1,962.2 1,908.7 1,750.6 1,477.2 1,256.8 Real sales 
Std. Dev. 5,188.2 7,931.6 7,980.2 9,096.5 8,481.6 9,132.1 8,413.3 6,310.0 
          
          
Mean 2.07 2.01 1.69 1.87 1.89 1.73 1.71 1.86 Labor productivity  
Std. Dev. 2.87 2.75 2.38 2.47 2.39 2.32 2.69 2.49 
          
          
Mean NA 0.43 -0.90 0.28 0.39 -0.03 0.06 0.24 Productivity growth Std. Dev. NA 4.22 0.62 2.30 12.75 0.48 0.99 1.16 
          
Number of firms 1,931 1,924 2,048 2,050 2,108 2,129 2,134 2,139 
 




Table 6: Productivity Growth by Largest Owner-Type 
 
 State Private Outside  Inside  Mass  
Mean –0.024 0.012 0.133 –0.007 –0.014 
(t-stat)  (4.03)**   (5.43)**   (1.75)    (0.64) 
N 10,857 3,670 466 13,028 11,752 
 
Notes: N refers to the number of firm-year observations.  Productivity growth is measured as 
the log of the ratio of labor productivity for year t to that for year t-1.  “State” and “Private” 
refer to majority ownership, while the disaggregated private ownership categories refer to 
largest shareholding; “outside” is all blockholder shares, “inside” refers to all shares obtained 
by employees through MEBO privatization, and “mass” consists of all shares distributed 
through the MPP.  Ownership is measured at end of year t-1.  The absolute value of the t-
statistic in parentheses tests the difference of means for each type of private owner relative to 




Table 7: Pre-Privatization Productivity Growth by Future Owner-Type 
 





year t  
Inside   after 
year t  
Mass    after 
year t 
Mean –0.032 –0.012 –0.007 0.000 –0.033 
(t-stat)  (1.75) (1.53) (1.91) (0.06) 
N 4526 3207 1132 966 929 
 
Notes: Firm-year observations are included only if the state is the largest owner in the given year.  Productivity 
growth is measured as the log of the ratio of labor productivity for year t to that for year t-1.  The absolute 
value of the t-statistic in parentheses test s the difference of means for each future largest owner-type relative to 





Table 8: The Estimated Impact of Private Shareholding 
 
 Estimation Method 
 OLS LAD Fixed-effects 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
PrivateShare 0.149** 0.015 0.102** 0.008 0.167** 0.016 
1994 –0.282** 0.015 –0.285** 0.010 –0.242** 0.013 
1995 –0.009 0.015 –0.018 0.010 –0.054** 0.013 
1996 –0.078** 0.014 –0.094** 0.010 –0.079** 0.014 
1997 –0.243** 0.015 –0.218** 0.010 –0.231** 0.016 
1998 –0.224** 0.017 –0.212** 0.011 –0.259** 0.016 
1999 –0.113** 0.019 –0.083** 0.011 –0.169** 0.018 
Log(St-1/Et-1) –0.175** 0.010 –0.102** 0.003 –0.594** 0.008 
Log(Et-1) 0.048** 0.004 0.028** 0.002 0.114** 0.011 
R2 0.147 0.078 0.346 
 
Number of observations: 14,532. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is labor productivity growth.  “PrivateShare” is the proportion of shares 
privately owned by the beginning of the year.  OLS and LAD regressions include controls for region (6 
categories) and industry (14 categories).  SE refers to estimated standard error.  OLS standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering on firms.  R2 refers to R2 for OLS, pseudo-R2 for LAD, and R2-within for fixed-
effects.  ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 9: The Estimated Impact of Private Shareholding Types 
 
 Estimation method  
 OLS LAD Fixed-effects 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
OutsideShare 0.344** 0.050 0.274** 0.024 0.392** 0.036 
InsideShare 0.161** 0.018 0.114** 0.012 0.178** 0.021 
MassShare 0.172** 0.035 0.108** 0.023 0.190** 0.036 
OtherShare 0.264** 0.074 0.179** 0.054 0.299** 0.106 
POFShare 0.166** 0.042 0.113** 0.031 0.264** 0.047 
R2 0.150 0.079 0.350 
 
Number of observations: 14,532. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is labor productivity growth.  Shareholding variables are expressed as 
proportions.  All regressions include year effects, lagged level of labor productivity, and lagged employment 
size as controls.  OLS and LAD regressions also include controls for region (6 categories) and industry (14 
categories).  SE refers to estimated standard error.  OLS standard errors are adjusted for clustering on firms.   
R2 refers to R2 for OLS, pseudo-R2 for LAD, and R2-within for fixed-effects.  ** indicates significance at the 
1 percent level. 
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Table 10: The Estimated Impact of Majority Privatization, Controlling 
for the PrivateEver Group Effect 
 
 Estimation method 
 OLS LAD 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
PrivateEver 0.042** 0.010 0.022** 0.007 
PrivateDummy 0.084** 0.012 0.066** 0.090 
R2 0.146 0.077 
 
Number of observations: 14,532. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is labor productivity growth.  “PrivateEver” is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the firm became majority privatized in any 
year during the sample period (1992 to 1999), and “PrivateDummy” is equal 
to one if the firm became majority privatized before the current year of the 
firm-year observation.  All regressions include lagged level of labor 
productivity, lagged employment, year effects (1994 to 1999), region effects 
(6 categories) and industry effects (14 categories) as controls.  SE refers to 
estimated standard error.  OLS standard errors are adjusted for clustering on 
firms.  R2 refers to R2 for OLS, pseudo-R2 for LAD, and R2-within for fixed-
effects.  ** indicates  significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 11: The Estimated Impact of Largest Private Owner-Type, Controlling 
for Ownership Group Effects 
 
 Estimation method 
 OLS LAD 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Ownership Group Effects 
  OutsideEver 0.046** 0.014 0.013 0.011 
  InsideEver 0.062** 0.014 0.035** 0.011 
  MassEver 0.000 0.014 0.002 0.012 
  OtherEver 0.033 0.052 0.074* 0.035 
  POFEver 0.011 0.059 0.056 0.065 
Current Ownership Effects 
  OutsideDummy 0.165** 0.032 0.150** 0.020 
  InsideDummy 0.055** 0.016 0.044** 0.013 
  MassDummy 0.083** 0.019 0.056** 0.017 
  OtherDummy 0.266** 0.104 0.104 0.069 
  POFDummy  0.262 0.146 0.056 0.091 
R2 0.148 0.078 
 
Number of observations: 14,532. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is labor productivity growth.  Group effects are 
dummies equal to one if the indicated private owner-type is ever the largest during 
the sample period.  All regressions include lagged level of labor productivity, lagged 
employment, year effects (1994 to 1999), region effects (6 categories), and industry 
effects (14 categories) as controls.  SE refers to estimated standard error.  OLS 
standard errors are adjusted for clustering on firms.  R2 refers to R2 for OLS, pseudo-
R2 for LAD, and R2-within for fixed-effects.  ** indicates significance at the 1 
percent level. 
 
